BANGUI, Central African Republic– As security conditions continue to deteriorate in the impoverished landlocked state of the Central African Republic (CAR,) media coverage has increasingly been focused on a wave of sectarian violence within the country. Anti-balaka militia groups who are characterized as primarily Christian militias have been accused of widespread targeting and killing of predominately Muslim civilians.
The attacks have left thousands dead, prompting the current transitional government to declare war on many of the renegade militias. While the fighting has increasingly gained religious tones in the rhetoric utilized to promote violence on the ground and in the discourse used within media reporting to explain the situation to the outside world, the Central African Republic conflict is much larger and more complex than such labeling implies.
Despite local Islamic and Christian religious leaders calling for restraint, there is no denying that civilians, particularly in the populous western region of the country, are currently being targeted and killed due to their Islamic affiliation. This reality, however, is a newer development in a much longer struggle rooted not in religious zeal, but in regional history, ethnic and tribal identity and political and economic concerns.
Background
Historically, the CAR has been a convergence point where northern Sudanic populations have come into contact with lower equatorial inhabitants. Much like the neighboring countries of Chad, Sudan and South Sudan have the 12th parallel dividing line that represents north-south tensions (leading in Sudan’s case to a breakup of the state,) the Central African Republic has very real north-south divides as well.
Northern (especially northeastern) residents of the state are often distinguished as the savanna population, while southerners are labeled as river people. Within these broader categories exists a myriad of ethnic grouping as well.
Colonially-established borders cut directly through 190 different cultural groups; the CAR was no exception. The northeastern section of the country represented a particularly troublesome ethnic division and was once considered part of what is modern day Chad before finally being dumped instead into the Ubangi-Chari territory, now the CAR.)
This historic and cultural division, coupled with a history of southern dominated political rule, has left much of the Northeast feeling economically and politically marginalized and isolated from the rest of the state. Such tensions ignited into armed rebellion following a 2003 coup against the first democratically elected president (and first northern president) of the country: Ange-Félix Patassé.
The Central African Republic conflict
Replacing the northern president, François Bozizé ruled the country with relative neglect. Outside of the capital, Bangui, and the state’s resource extraction operations, Bozizé paid little attention to much of the rest of the country. The renewed corruption and neglect that the new administration promised paved the way for northern factions to claim ideological high ground and rebel.
The Central African Bush War, as it became known, lasted until roughly 2008, when a seemingly workable peace accord was finally agreed upon (other peace agreements were signed spanning until 2012.) The conflict encompassed many different factions; some major, others minor, none really based on religious adherence.
These factions were also not united; at times, they even fought each other over control of territory and control of resources. In September 2011 the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) and Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR,) two major rebel factions, clashed in Bria over control of local diamond mining operations.
Shortly after the peace accord, Bozizé continued with many of his standard governing tactics, prompting resurgence in northern rebellion toward the end of 2012. This time however, many of the main rebel movements decided to work together under the banner of the Seleka coalition.
Roots of Sectarianism
Often the cases of sectarian violence exist as one of inappropriate association. The Seleka rebel confederation was not gentle in its march south to the capital. Thousands of civilians were killed and tens of thousands saw their homes destroyed. Most affected were religiously Christian due to the demographics of the regions in which violence took place; Seleka rebels often attacked and mistreated the regional Muslim minorities as well.
After the coalition was disbanded, Seleka factions returned to the countryside to continue raiding and pillaging without accountability. Said factions moved to occupy towns, steal resources, damage property, rape locals and even torture or kill civilians before leaving. By the time the transitional government was put into place, such terrorizing had uprooted 935,000 people from their homes.
The anti-balaka militias entering the region afterward, angry at the abuses and seeking vengeance, sought to vent their rage on whoever they could associate with the former Seleka fighters. With significant numbers of the rebels within the former coalition carrying an Islamic identity, the bearers of the brunt of this impotent rage and frustration become Muslim civilians who often have little in common with the rebel factions. The targeted killing has increased as former Seleka factions dissolve; as anti-balaka militias become more firmly rooted and empowered. Now, attacks on convoys of fleeing Muslim civilians have become almost commonplace.
This sense of sectarian struggle was previously fomented by Bozizé; in last ditch efforts to stave off the Seleka advance and reduce their public legitimacy, he engaged in heavy propaganda through which the rebel coalition was labeled as religious Islamic extremists and terrorists. Bozizé hoped to utilize the sectarian rhetoric to do exactly what it has: prompt Christian youths to take up arms against them; it simply happened too late to save his administration.
The growth of sectarian rhetoric and actions has also impacted how remaining former Seleka rebels choose their targets. Reports indicate their operations too have become more religiously focused than they previously were, indicating an increase in religious identity grouping. Targeted revenge attacks against Christians have also started to occur by non-Seleka aligned civilian mobs that identify as Muslim further indicating increased tensions along religious lines as fighting continues.
Even while self-promoting feedback loops of sectarian attitudes are on the rise, an Amnesty International report found looting and financial plundering of Islamic populations who tend to clump into the merchant and trader classes to be a significant and, at times, even primary motivation behind attacks. This suggests that even while discourse surrounding religious identity and imagery of self-defense is utilized as a means of justification, it is instead opportunism and financial gain that may motivate a number of ongoing attacks.
Moving Forward
While sectarian attitudes have been dominating headlines, the Central African Republic conflict is much deeper and more complex than mere religious affiliation can account for. Thus, peace depends on remaining focused not only on the communal violence, but on what variables instigated militant discontent in the first place.
Another truth to take note of is that Bozizé stood little chance against a unified rebel front. Fearful of the very thing that brought him to power (a military coup,) the central police force and military of the Central African Republic has long remained relatively weak and underpaid (the latter of which contributed to three mutinies under Patassé.)
The existing security gap has made it difficult for the current transition government headed by Catherine Samba-Panza to stop attacks. Worse still, there have been disturbing testimonies citing government troops joining anti-balaka militias in looting activities.
Until order can be restored, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has called for the deployment of 3,000 additional peacekeepers, bringing the total of U.N. peacekeepers up to 11,000. In the meantime, it is up to the interim government to make efforts to tackle some of the long standing social, economic and institutional problems that has led it to its current condition.
– Ty Butler
Sources: Martin Meredith, Gerard Prunier , AllAfrica, CNN, Amnesty International, Council on Foreign Relations, Brookings, Global Security
Photo: African Arguments